Military


1. Незамедлительное и всеобъемлющее прекращение огня в отдельных районах Донецкой и Луганской областей Украины и его строгое выполнение начиная с 00 ч. 00 мин. (киевское время) 15 февраля 2015 года.

2. Отвод всех тяжелых вооружений обеими сторонами на равные расстояния в целях создания зоны безопасности шириной минимум 50 км друг от друга для артиллерийских систем калибром 100 мм и более, зоны безопасности шириной 70 км для РСЗО и шириной 140 км для РСЗО «Торнадо-С», «Ураган», «Смерч» и тактических ракетных систем «Точка» («Точка У»):

- для украинских войск: от фактической линии соприкосновения;

- для вооруженных формирований отдельных районов Донецкой и Луганской областей Украины: от линии соприкосновения согласно Минскому меморандуму от 19 сентября 2014 г.

Отвод вышеперечисленных тяжелых вооружений должен начаться не позднее второго дня после прекращения огня и завершиться в течение 14 дней.

Этому процессу будет содействовать ОБСЕ при поддержке Трехсторонней Контактной группы. Minsk2KartaRia1

3. Обеспечить эффективный мониторинг и верификацию режима прекращения огня и отвода тяжелого вооружения со стороны ОБСЕ с первого дня отвода, с применением всех необходимых технических средств, включая спутники, БПЛА, радиолокационные системы и пр.

4. В первый день после отвода начать диалог о модальностях проведения местных выборов в соответствии с украинским законодательством и Законом Украины «О временном порядке местного самоуправления в отдельных районах Донецкой и Луганской областей», а также о будущем режиме этих районов на основании указанного закона.

Незамедлительно, не позднее 30 дней с даты подписания данного документа, принять постановление Верховной Рады Украины с указанием территории, на которую распространяется особый режим в соответствии с Законом Украины «О временном порядке местного самоуправления в отдельных районах Донецкой и Луганской областей» на основе линии, установленной в Минском меморандуме от 19 сентября 2014 г.

5. Обеспечить помилование и амнистию путем введения в силу закона, запрещающего преследование и наказание лиц в связи с событиями, имевшими место в отдельных районах Донецкой и Луганской областей Украины.

6. Обеспечить освобождение и обмен всех заложников и незаконно удерживаемых лиц на основе принципа «всех на всех». Этот процесс должен быть завершен самое позднее на пятый день после отвода.

7. Обеспечить безопасный доступ, доставку, хранение и распределение гуманитарной помощи нуждающимся на основе международного механизма.

8. Определение модальностей полного восстановления социально-экономических связей, включая социальные переводы, такие как выплата пенсий и иные выплаты (поступления и доходы, своевременная оплата всех коммунальных счетов, возобновление налогообложения в рамках правового поля Украины).

В этих целях Украина восстановит управление сегментом своей банковской системы в районах, затронутых конфликтом, и, возможно, будет создан международный механизм для облегчения таких переводов.

9.  Восстановление полного контроля над государственной границей со стороны правительства Украины во всей зоне конфликта, которое должно начаться в первый день после местных выборов и завершиться после всеобъемлющего политического урегулирования (местные выборы в отдельных районах Донецкой и Луганской областей на основании Закона Украины и конституционная реформа) к концу 2015 года при условии выполнения пункта 11 – в консультациях и по согласованию с представителями отдельных районов Донецкой и Луганской областей в рамках Трехсторонней Контактной группы.

10. Вывод всех иностранных вооруженных формирований, военной техники, а также наемников с территории Украины под наблюдением ОБСЕ. Разоружение всех незаконных групп.

11. Проведение конституционной реформы в Украине со вступлением в силу к концу 2015 года новой конституции, предполагающей в качестве ключевого элемента децентрализацию (с учетом особенностей отдельных районов Донецкой и Луганской областей, согласованных с представителями этих районов), а также принятие постоянного законодательства об особом статусе отдельных районов Донецкой и Луганской областей в соответствии с мерами, указанными в примечании[1], до конца 2015 года. (См. примечание.)

12. На основании Закона Украины «О временном порядке местного самоуправления в отдельных районах Донецкой и Луганской областей» вопросы, касающиеся местных выборов, будут обсуждаться и согласовываться с представителями отдельных районов Донецкой и Луганской областей в рамках Трехсторонней Контактной группы. Выборы будут проведены с соблюдением соответствующих стандартов ОБСЕ при мониторинге со стороны БДИПЧ ОБСЕ.

13. Интенсифицировать деятельность Трехсторонней Контактной группы, в том числе путем создания рабочих групп по выполнению соответствующих аспектов Минских соглашений. Они будут отражать состав Трехсторонней Контактной группы.

Примечание:

Такие меры в соответствии с Законом «Об особом порядке местного самоуправления в отдельных районах Донецкой и Луганской областей» включают следующее:

- освобождение от наказания, преследования и дискриминации лиц, связанных с событиями, имевшими место в отдельных районах Донецкой и Луганской областей;

- право на языковое самоопределение;

- участие органов местного самоуправления в назначении глав органов прокуратуры и судов в отдельных районах Донецкой и Луганской областей;

- возможность для центральных органов исполнительной власти заключать с соответствующими органами местного самоуправления соглашения относительно экономического, социального и культурного развития отдельных районов Донецкой и Луганской областей;

- государство оказывает поддержку социально-экономическому развитию отдельных районов Донецкой и Луганской областей;

- содействие со стороны центральных органов власти трансграничному сотрудничеству в отдельных районах Донецкой и Луганской областей с регионами Российской Федерации;

- создание отрядов народной милиции по решению местных советов с целью поддержания общественного порядка в отдельных районах Донецкой и Луганской областей;

- полномочия депутатов местных советов и должностных лиц, избранных на досрочных выборах, назначенных Верховной Радой Украины этим законом, не могут быть досрочно прекращены.

Документ подписали участники Трехсторонней Контактной группы:

Посол Хайди Тальявини

Второй Президент Украины Л.Д. Кучма

Посол Российской Федерации на Украине М.Ю. Зурабов

А.В. Захарченко

И.В. Плотницкий

Источник карты: Риа (Россия)

Президент Российской Федерации Владимир Путин, Президент Украины Пётр Порошенко, Президент Французской Республики Франсуа Олланд и Канцлер Федеративной Республики Германия Ангела Меркель подтверждают полное уважение суверенитета и территориальной целостности Украины. Они твёрдо убеждены в безальтернативности исключительно мирного урегулирования. Они всецело готовы предпринять любые возможные меры как по отдельности, так и совместно в этих целях.

В этом контексте лидеры одобряют Комплекс мер по выполнению Минских соглашений, принятый и подписанный в Минске 12 февраля 2015 года всеми, кто также подписал Минский протокол от 5 сентября 2014 года и Минский меморандум от 19 сентября 2014 года. Лидеры будут вносить вклад в этот процесс и использовать своё влияние на соответствующие стороны, чтобы способствовать выполнению этого Комплекса мер.

Германия и Франция окажут техническую поддержку для восстановления сегмента банковской системы в затронутых конфликтом районах, возможно, путём создания международного механизма для содействия осуществлению социальных выплат.

Лидеры разделяют убеждение в том, что укрепление сотрудничества между Европейским Союзом, Украиной и Россией будет способствовать урегулированию данного кризиса. В этих целях они поддерживают продолжение трёхсторонних переговоров между Европейским Союзом, Украиной и Россией по вопросам энергетики с тем, чтобы осуществить шаги в развитие «зимнего газового пакета».

Они также поддерживают трёхсторонние переговоры между Европейским Союзом, Украиной и Россией в целях выработки практического решения вопросов, вызывающих обеспокоенность России, в связи с выполнением Соглашения о глубокой и всеобъемлющей зоне свободной торговли между Украиной и Европейским Союзом.

Лидеры по-прежнему привержены идее создания общего гуманитарного и экономического пространства от Атлантики до Тихого океана на основе полного уважения международного права и принципов ОБСЕ.

Лидеры будут и впредь привержены выполнению Минских соглашений. С этой целью они договорились о создании контрольного механизма в «нормандском формате», который будет проводить встречи с регулярной периодичностью, как правило, на уровне старших должностных лиц, представляющих министерства иностранных дел.

La guerra civile in Ucraina orientale si avvia a diventare nei prossimi mesi un conflitto dimenticato, mentre i leader internazionali – a parole – continuano a litigare.  Dopo la tregua sancita il 5 settembre 2014 a Minsk gli scontri sono diminuiti di intensità, ma si muore lo stesso. Secondo alcuni calcoli dall’inizio del cessate il fuoco hanno perso la vita già una trentina di persone.

Gli epicentri dei combattimenti sono sul mare di Azov tra Mariupol e Novoazovsk – gli abitanti del centro portuale odono i colpi in lontananza – e nei pressi dell’aeroporto di Donetsk, ancora nelle mani dei governativi. A Gorlovka l’ordine pubblico è precario. A Lugansk l’elettricità manca in alcuni quartieri dopo che una centrale è stata centrata da un colpo di mortaio. UN flag

Secondo l’Agenzia per gli affari umanitari dell’Onu all’11 settembre 2014 sono morte 3.171 persone (tra cui 27 bambini), 8.061 (non meno di 56 bambini) sono i feriti. OHCHR/WHO. Gli sfollati in Patria sono 262.977, quelli all’estero 366.866.

“E’ stato l’ultimo addio all’Unione Sovietica”. Così il presidente ucraino Petro Poroshenko in un discorso al Parlamento canadese, prima di volare a Washington dal collega statunitense Barack Obama. La ratifica del Patto di Associazione con l’Unione europea è per Kiev il passo decisivo verso un futuro diverso.

I separatisti dell’Est non sono d’accordo ed insistono per l’indipendenza nonostante la maggiore autonomia ottenuta sulla carta. Le elezioni locali, programmate per il 7 dicembre, dovrebbero essere un nuovo spartiacque nelle intenzioni del governo centrale. Il dubbio è, però, se queste consultazioni si terranno mai.

In Russia, intanto, la situazione economica inizia a preoccupare. Il dollaro e l’euro hanno segnato nuovi record contro il rublo anche per il deprezzamento sensibile del petrolio sui mercati internazionali. 105 è il valore minimo per Mosca per salvare il proprio budget statale. “No al panico”, è la parola d’ordine.

Il tempo delle operazioni militari sta finendo per l’avvicinarsi dell’inverno; è venuta l’ora di una tregua fra gli ucraini; Mosca si prepari ad un serio negoziato.

È questo il messaggio recapitato a Kiev personalmente da Angela Merkel prima del summit a Minsk tra europei ed ex sovietici. In estrema sintesi, le parti in causa facciano un passo indietro e diano una chance alla pace. I presidenti russo Putin e ucraino Poroshenko avranno l’occasione di parlarsi a quattr’occhi o alla presenza di mediatori. Che sfruttino l’occasione! ATO25082014

La cancelliera tedesca è stata chiarissima. Primo: l’Ucraina ha bisogno di “decentralizzare i poteri dello Stato” in modo da fornire garanzie alle regioni dell’Est, popolate da una maggioranza russofona. Secondo: Berlino e l’Unione europea doneranno “500 milioni di euro per l’immediata ricostruzione”. Terzo: non verrà riconosciuta l’annessione della Crimea da parte del Cremlino. Quarto: se la situazione non migliorerà rapidamente “non sono escluse nuove sanzioni” contro la Russia, alla quale non verranno fatte concessioni, poiché la crisi è troppo pericolosa. Nelle settimane passate la Merkel ha definito Putin un uomo che vive “in un altro mondo”.

Berlino è in realtà preoccupata che con l’approssimarsi della stagione fredda Mosca possa iniziare a giocare con le forniture del gas. L’Unione europea dipende per un 30% circa del suo fabbisogno dalla russa Gazprom. Approssimativamente l’80% di questi approvvigionamenti transitano in Ucraina. Per ora le reazioni anti-occidentali del Cremlino sono state spuntate e ad uso della propaganda interna.

Sul piano militare i governativi di Kiev hanno riconquistato gran parte delle due regioni ribelli, costringendo i separatisti ad asserragliarsi nelle tre città di Donetsk, Gorlovka e Lugansk. Non riescono per ora solo a sigillare la frontiera per evitare l’arrivo di uomini freschi e armi in soccorso.

Kiev non pare, tuttavia, avere unità speciali sufficienti per snidare in fretta nei centri urbani quelle poche migliaia di guerriglieri delle due Repubbliche popolari presenti.
E il tempo, adesso, gioca contro di lei: l’autunno e il rigido inverno sono alle porte. Gran parte della popolazione è fuggita dalle zone del conflitto: la sua stragrande maggioranza è ospite di parenti o amici; in percentuale in pochi sono nei campi profughi. Le vacanze, forzatamente cominciate a giugno, devono finire, anche perché i soldi iniziano a scarseggiare.
La gente, sia a Lugansk che a Donetsk, non ne può più: vuole la fine della guerra civile. I pochi che avevano dimostrato supporto per i separatisti, si sono diradati. I ribelli stanno distruggendo le infrastrutture per provocare una crisi umanitaria, che, per il momento, non esiste a Donetsk, ma si intravede a Lugansk città. Quella è una delle poche carte restate loro in mano.

A Minsk, in conclusione, vi sarà il tentativo di trovare una soluzione, facendo uscire tutti dalla crisi con la faccia pulita…o quasi.

Giuseppe D’Amato

1/4 Comms with military observers in Donetsk region lost.Team not OSCE monitors but sent by States under Vienna Doc on military transparency

7:35 PM – 25 Apr 2014

2/4 All members of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and OSCE/ODIHR election observers are safe and accounted for

7:36 PM – 25 Apr 2014

3/4 Military verification team – led by Germans – and composed of 8 members – 4 Germans, 1 Czech, 1 Danish, 1 Polish, 1 Swedish

7:36 PM – 25 Apr 2014

4/4 Military verification team sent following invitation from Ukraine under terms of Vienna Document 2011

7:37 PM – 25 Apr 2014

Source: OSCE.org

The Vienna Document is an agreement between the participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe implementing confidence and security building measures. Osce2011
Its provisions include an annual exchange of military information about forces located in Europe (defined as the Atlantic to the Urals), notifications for risk reduction including consultation about unusual military activities and hazardous incidents, prior notification of certain military activities, observation of certain military activities, exchange of annual calendars, and compliance and verification by inspection and evaluation visits.
This exchange differs from the Global Exchange of Military Information in that it is limited to forces in Europe, while the Global Exchange of Military Information applies to all forces of the participating states, wherever located.
The annual exchange of information is conducted concurrently with the annual exchange of information under the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, in Vienna, Austria in December of each year. The Vienna Document has been revised periodically, and the current version is the 2011 version.
 From Wikipedia

 –

Overview of Vienna Document 2011

Vienna Document 2011 (VD11) is composed of politically binding confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) designed to increase openness and transparency concerning military activities conducted inside the OSCE’s zone of application (ZOA), which includes the territory, surrounding sea areas, and air space of all European (Russia from the western border to the Ural Mountains) and Central Asian participating States. A variety of information exchanges, on-site inspections, evaluation visits, observation visits, and other military-to-military contacts take place according to VD11 provisions. In the case of the United States (and Canada), only military forces and activities inside the ZOA are impacted.

VD11 builds on previous agreements: the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the Document of the Stockholm Conference of 1986, the 1992 Helsinki Document, and the Vienna Documents of 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1999. It is part of an interlocking web of mutually enforcing agreements, including the Treaties on Conventional Arms Control in Europe (CFE) and Open Skies, which form the current European conventional arms control framework.

C’è anche la “risorgente” Russia nella partita mediorientale e con lei bisogna fare i conti. Non solo al Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’Onu ma anche in campo militare. Se il regime di Bashar Assad è ancora al potere un non piccolo merito lo si può attribuire a Vladimir Putin. AssadPutin
Mosca si è incaponita nella difesa del suo storico alleato siriano per due fondamentali ragioni, entrambi di carattere geostrategico.
La prima è che, una volta caduta Damasco, dopo toccherà all’Iran. I russi vedrebbero gli occidentali avvicinarsi tremendamente alle frontiere meridionali ex sovietiche. A chi farebbe piacere avere come vicino un ex avversario della Guerra Fredda che porta il nome di Nato, ossia Alleanza atlantica?
La seconda ragione è che più si impegnano gli occidentali in scenari lontani da casa più si ritarda la loro infiltrazione nel cuore degli interessi del Cremlino, nel cortile di casa, lo spazio ex sovietico.
Considerazioni di ordine pubblico interno, poi, non sono secondarie. Per tutti gli anni Novanta i russi hanno combattuto contro l’estremismo religioso islamico che ha infuocato il Caucaso settentrionale ed ha rischiato di mettere radici persino nel “ventre mollo” del gigante slavo, lungo il corso del Volga, nelle repubbliche ricchissime di petrolio del Tatarstan e della Bashkiria.
Aleppo è a solo 900 chilometri dal Caucaso. Se la Siria capitolasse da lì potrebbero arrivare nuovi mujaheddin, già sconfitti in passato in Cecenia, o semplici mullah a predicare ai circa 20 milioni di musulmani russi un tipo di Islam non più secolare come quello ex sovietico. Il numero di donne che portano oggi il velo in Russia è già aumentato enormemente, tanto che per il nuovo anno scolastico sono diventate obbligatori grembiuli e vestiti elencati in liste “dress code”.
L’aspetto economico-commerciale nella posizione del Cremlino sullo scenario mediorientale è altrettanto importante. La Siria compra da decenni miliardi di dollari in armi russe, mentre l’Iran ha acquistato da Mosca tecnologia nucleare.
Nelle scorse settimane è filtrata la notizia, non confermata chiaramente, che il principe saudita Bandar al Sultan, capo dei servizi segreti sauditi, abbia offerto 15 miliardi di dollari per convincere Vladimir Putin ad abbandonare Assad. Riad vorrebbe diventare un acquirente di armi russe sofisticate, che, secondo le intelligence israeliana ed occidentali, sono state, comunque, consegnate ad Assad, malgrado i vari divieti internazionali. In primo luogo le difesa aeree anti-missilistiche S-300 e quelle navali, che costringeranno le unità americane a starsene lontano dalle coste.
Il fronte dell’opposizione avrebbe promesso, tra l’altro, di lasciare ai russi l’uso del porto di Tartus, utilizzato come scalo nel Mediterraneo, evitando il passaggio sul Bosforo.
Il Cremlino per ora fa spallucce. Se dopo la Siria cadesse anche l’Iran gli occidentali avrebbero la possibilità di rivoluzionare il mercato energetico. Finalmente si troverebbe il gas sufficiente, necessario per ridare vita al progetto Nabucco e l’Europa sarebbe ancora meno dipendente dalle forniture russe.
In sintesi, Mosca sta combattendo in Medio Oriente una battaglia strategicamente vitale. In palio vi è il suo status di potenza regionale in questa porzione di mondo.
Una sua squadra navale, proveniente dal Pacifico, è arrivata nelle scorse settimane in zona. La sua potenza di fuoco è infinitamente inferiore a quella statunitense. Il suo compito è duplice: essere pronta ad evacuare i circa 20mila connazionali; mostrare all’opinione pubblica che la Russia è ancora viva.
Putin conosce bene i limiti del suo Paese e non andrà oltre. Sa perfettamente che la Russia post ’91 non è nemmeno lontana parente dell’Unione Sovietica della Guerra Fredda.
Giuseppe D’Amato

18 Mar: New SIPRI data on arms transfers – China replaces UK as world’s fifth largest arms exporter

China has become the fifth largest exporter of major conventional arms worldwide, according to new data on international arms transfers published by SIPRI. This is the first time China has been in the top five arms exporters since the end of the cold war. Overall, the volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons grew by 17 per cent between 2003–2007 and 2008–12.

The five largest suppliers of major conventional weapons during the five-year period 2008–12 were the United States (30 per cent of global arms exports), Russia (26 per cent), Germany (7 per cent), France (6 per cent) and China (5 per cent). This is the first time that the UK has not been in the top five since at least 1950, the earliest year covered by SIPRI data. China’s displacement of the UK is the first change in the composition of the top five exporters in 20 years.

The volume of Chinese exports of major conventional weapons rose by 162 per cent between 2003–2007 and 2008–2012, and its share of the volume of international arms exports increased from 2 to 5 per cent.

‘China’s rise has been driven primarily by large-scale arms acquisitions by Pakistan,’ said Dr Paul Holtom, Director of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme. ‘However, a number of recent deals indicate that China is establishing itself as a significant arms supplier to a growing number of important recipient states.’

Asian imports strengthen naval capabilities

In the period 2008–12 Asia and Oceania accounted for almost half (47 per cent) of global imports of major conventional weapons. The top five importers of major conventional weapons worldwide—India (12 per cent of global imports), China (6 per cent), Pakistan (5 per cent), South Korea (5 per cent), and Singapore (4 per cent)—were all in Asia.

Several countries in Asia and Oceania have in recent years ordered or announced plans to acquire long-range strike and support systems that would make them capable of projecting power far beyond their national borders. Last year notably saw the delivery of a nuclear-powered submarine from Russia to India and the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning.

Other regional players are seeking to establish or strengthen submarine fleets, including several South East Asian countries and Australia, which is also acquiring large surface warships and combat aircraft. These developments come at a time of heightening tensions over territorial disputes in the East and South China seas.

Austerity bites in the European arms market

Deliveries to European countries fell by 20 per cent between 2003–2007 and 2008–12. European states seem eager to abandon or reduce a range of arms import plans. During 2012 Italy and the Netherlands reduced their orders for F-35 combat aircraft from the USA, while Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania dropped plans for newly produced combat aircraft in favour of second-hand options.

Many European states are also seeking to export newly acquired combat aircraft that they can no longer afford to maintain. For example, Portugal is seeking buyers for its new fleet of F-16s and Spain is seeking to sell newly purchased Eurofighter Typhoons.

‘With the financial crisis in Europe, the withdrawal from Iraq and the drawdown in Afghanistan, we can expect to see Europe trying to export a considerable volume of surplus military equipment,’ said Mark Bromley, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.

Other notable developments 

  • Russia accounted for 71 per cent of exports of major weapons to Syria in 2008–12 and continued to deliver arms and ammunition in 2012.
  • The Arab states of the Gulf accounted for 7 per cent of world arms imports in 2008–2012. Missile defence systems were an important element in their latest arms acquisitions, with orders placed in 2011–12 for Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD systems from the USA.
  • Deliveries of weapons system to Venezuela as part of its ongoing rearmament programme continued in 2012. Russia accounted for 66 per cent of transfers to Venezuela, followed by Spain (12 per cent) and China (12 per cent).
  • Imports by North African states increased by 350 per cent between 2003–2007 and 2008–12, which was almost entirely responsible for a doubling (by 104 per cent) in imports by Africa as a whole.
  • Sub-Saharan imports increased by just 5 per cent. Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa imported only small numbers of major weapons, but many of these have been used in internal conflicts or in interventions in conflicts in neighbouring states, most recently in Mali.
  • Greece’s arms imports fell by 61 per cent between 2003–2007 and 2008–12, pushing it from the number 4 importer to number 15. In 2006–10 Greece was the top recipient of German arms exports and the third largest recipient of French arms exports.
From spacewar.com

From spacewar.com

 To fund boosting its west coast defences, the US is to scrap plans to place SM-3 IIB missile in Europe and deploy them in Alaska.
The long-range interceptors were to have been the final phase of a program that Russia contends aims to counter its own missiles. Washington says the system is meant to stop missiles from Iran and North Korea.
U.S. Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel, however, stressed that plans are on track to deploy shorter-range missiles to Poland and Romania within the next five years.
“We feel no euphoria in connection with what was announced by the U.S. defence secretary, and we see no grounds for correcting our position”, said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov.
“This is not a concession to Russia and we do not see it as such,” he added. “We will continue a dialogue and seek the signing of legally binding agreements that all elements of the U.S. missile-defence system are not aimed at Russian strategic nuclear forces.”
In recent past U.S. defence and political officials stated that shorter-range interceptors would still be based in Poland as part of NATO’s missile defence system in Europe.
The Obama administration has planned to put medium-range interceptors in Redzikowo, in northern Poland, starting in 2018, as part of the NATO system.
The U.S. missile defence plans involve building up the system in Europe in four stages, with shorter- and medium-range interceptors to be deployed in the first three phases, and longer-range interceptors due in the fourth phase.
However, the fourth stage has not yet been funded by Congress, and there are indications the technology is not ready. At the same time they have been an irritant in relations between the U.S. and Russia.
Phase one of the system has already been deployed, with anti-missile interceptors on a ship in the Mediterranean Sea. Phase two is to include interceptors in Romania, then interceptors in Poland will come as part of phase three.
The U.S. missile defence system at Romania’s Deveselu military base is not affected either and will become operational in 2015 as planned.
Poland’s main aim in having the U.S. interceptors has been to have an American military presence on Polish soil in the belief it will increase the country’s security, particularly given fears that Russia could one day try to dominate the region again.
The US will now add 14 interceptors against incoming missile threats, to the 30 already in place in California and Alaska by 2017.

 Sources: PAP, Reuters, AP, AFP

 

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012 

 We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Chicago to renew our commitment to our vital transatlantic bond; take stock of progress in, and reconfirm our commitment to, our operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere; ensure the Alliance has the capabilities it needs to deal with the full range of threats; and strengthen our wide range of partnerships.

20. NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO.  Fully strengthening this strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organisations and enshrined in the Strategic Concept, is particularly important in the current environment of austerity; NATO and the EU should continue to work to enhance practical cooperation in operations, broaden political consultations, and cooperate more fully in capability development.  NATO and the EU are working side by side in crisis management operations, in a spirit of mutual reinforcement, and in particular in Afghanistan, Kosovo and fighting piracy.  NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence.  NATO also recognises non-EU Allies’ ongoing concerns and their significant contributions to strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in these efforts is essential.   In this context, NATO will work closely with the EU, as agreed, to ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing; we welcome the efforts of the EU, in particular in the areas of air-to-air refuelling, medical support, maritime surveillance and training.  We also welcome the national efforts in these and other areas by European Allies and Partners.  We also encourage the Secretary General to continue his dialogue with the EU High Representative with a view to making our cooperation more effective, and to report to the Council in time for the next Summit.

 35.  An independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security.  Marking the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, we welcome Ukraine’s commitment to enhancing political dialogue and interoperability with NATO, as well as its contributions to NATO-led operations and new offers made.  We note the recent elimination of Ukraine’s highly enriched uranium in March 2012, which demonstrates a proven commitment to non-proliferation. Recalling our decisions in relation to Ukraine and our Open Door policy stated at the Bucharest and Lisbon Summits, NATO is ready to continue to develop its cooperation with Ukraine and assist with the implementation of reforms in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Annual National Programme (ANP).  Noting the principles and commitments enshrined in the NATO-Ukraine Charter and the ANP, we are concerned by the selective application of justice and what appear to be politically motivated prosecutions, including of leading members of the opposition, and the conditions of their detention.  We encourage Ukraine to address the existing shortcomings of its judicial system to ensure full compliance with the rule of law and the international agreements to which it is a party.  We also encourage Ukraine to ensure free, fair and inclusive Parliamentary elections this autumn.

 36. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security.  We remain determined to build a lasting and inclusive peace, together with Russia, in the Euro-Atlantic area, based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration.  We want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.

37.  This year, we mark the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.  We welcome important progress in our cooperation with Russia over the years.  At the same time, we differ on specific issues and there is a need to improve trust, reciprocal transparency, and predictability in order to realise the full potential of the NRC.  In this context, we intend to raise with Russia in the NRC Allied concerns about Russia’s stated intentions regarding military deployments close to Alliance borders.  Mindful of the goals, principles and commitments which underpin the NRC, and on this firm basis, we urge Russia to meet its commitments with respect to Georgia, as mediated by the EU on 12 August and 8 September 2008 3.  We continue to be concerned by the build-up of Russia’s military presence on Georgia’s territory and continue to call on Russia to ensure free access for humanitarian assistance and international observers.

 38. NATO and Russia share common security interests and face common challenges and our practical achievements together reflect that reality.  Today, we continue to value the important role of the NRC as a forum for frank and honest political dialogue – including on subjects where we disagree – and for promoting practical cooperation. Our cooperation with Russia on issues related to Afghanistan – notably the two-way transit arrangements offered by Russia in support of ISAF, our joint training of counter narcotics personnel from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan, and the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund in support of a key ANSF need – is a sign of our common determination to build peace and stability in that region.  NATO-Russia counter-terrorism cooperation has expanded and all NRC nations will benefit from the lessons to be learned from the first civil-military NRC Counter-Terrorism exercise, and the capabilities available under the NRC aviation counter-terrorism programme which is now operational.  We also note with satisfaction our growing counter-piracy cooperation off the Horn of Africa.  We are committed to, and look forward to, further improving trust and reciprocal transparency in: defence matters; strategy; doctrines; military postures, including of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe; military exercises; arms control and disarmament; and we invite Russia to engage with the Alliance in discussing confidence-building measures covering these issues.

 47.  With our vision of a Euro-Atlantic area at peace, the persistence of protracted regional conflicts in South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova continues to be a matter of great concern for the Alliance.  We welcome the constructive approach in the renewed dialogue on Transnistria in the 5+2 format, and encourage further efforts by all actors involved.  With respect to all these conflicts, we urge all parties to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, and to respect the current negotiation formats.  We call on them all to avoid steps that undermine regional security and stability.  We remain committed in our support of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova, and will also continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, based upon these principles and the norms of international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act.

48. The Black Sea region continues to be important for Euro-Atlantic security.  We welcome the progress in consolidating regional cooperation and ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms, in the spirit of transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness.  We will continue to support, as appropriate, efforts based on regional priorities and dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance.

 52. A stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance.  While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organisations concerned, NATO closely follows relevant developments in energy security.  Today, we have noted a progress report which outlines the concrete steps taken since our last Summit and describes the way forward to integrate, as appropriate, energy security considerations in NATO’s policies and activities.  We will continue to consult on energy security and further develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value.  To this end, we will work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces; develop our competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and further develop our outreach activities in consultation with partners, on a case-by-case basis.  We welcome the offer to establish a NATO-accredited Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania as a contribution to NATO’s efforts in this area.  We task the Council to continue to refine NATO’s role in energy security in accordance with the principles and the guidelines agreed at the Bucharest Summit and the direction provided by the new Strategic Concept as well as the Lisbon decisions.  We task the Council to produce a further progress report for our next Summit.

 Complete TextNATO – Chicago.

“On the first day of its summit in Chicago, NATO has declared stage one of its European missile defense shield “provisionally operational.”
“It is the first step towards our long-term goal of providing full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces,” NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told reporters on Sunday.
Specifically, this means that the United States has transferred command of a radar system in Turkey to NATO’s command and allowed the alliance to direct the missile defense system stationed on US ships. These ships can also be placed under NATO command. Spain, Turkey, Romania and Poland have agreed to deploy key parts of the U.S. missile defense system on their soil.
The White House says it expects initial operational capability by 2015, while the system will be fully functional in 2018. All 28 members of the alliance will participate in the financing.
The missile defense shield has created tension with Russia, which views the system as a threat. Rasmussen stressed that Russia has no influence on the sovereign decision of NATO’s member states but still invited Moscow to co-operate in discussions on the subject. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle also said ahead of the summit that Russia is welcome to work on a joint security strategy for Europe: “The door remains open for Russia.”  …

ArticleDeutsche Welle

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